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Abstract  
 
Purpose 
Labour came to power in 1997 and immediately transferred many features of its party 
political news management style into government, overseeing the departure of most 
of the civil service communications leadership within two years, and developing the 
media management role of politically appointed special advisers.  This paper 
empirically examines the changes in custom and practice that operated behind the 
scenes in government communications after 1997, asking to what extent such 
changes challenge public trust in government in a liberal democracy.   
Methodology 
It takes a longitudinal, qualitative approach through in-depth interviews with former 
civil servants, journalists and special advisers, together with documentary and 
archival evidence.   
Novel approach and contribution 
The study uses the concept of the ‘cross field’ to demonstrate how PR professionals  
share media management responsibilities with a number of different promotional 
actors.  Here, they navigate between the  hidden, competitive and demanding worlds 
of politics, the media and bureaucracy, to craft the narratives that seek to drive public 
opinion.   
Findings 
The paper finds that although the controversy over the 2002 dossier on Iraq’s 
Weapons of Mass Destruction was an extraordinary episode, the creative approach to 
news management that characterised this case still operates within UK government 
communications: the bypassing of civil servants, a partial approach to the facts, 
selective briefing of favoured journalists, a lack of due process in the management of 
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information and a disregard for the letter and spirit of propriety codes.  This has 
implications for public trust and confidence in the workings of liberal democracy. 
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The unseen power of creative news management in government:  
The marginalisation of UK government press officers between 1997 
and 2015  
 
1. Introduction 
The publication by the UK government of the dossier Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction on 24 
September 2002 was, and continues to be, widely scrutinised (Butler, 2004; Chilcot, 2016a; 
Hutton, 2004). What is less well-known, is the unseen role played by the permanent officials 
delegated to speak to the media on behalf of the government, that is, government press officers, 
in either sanctioning or producing what turned out to be an inaccurate document in which 
"more weight was placed on the intelligence than it could bear" and which stretched available 
intelligence "to the outer limits" (Butler, 2004).   
The chain of events was unique, but although so it should not be assumed that the process 
leading up to the publication of the 2002 dossier was not typical of government media 
operations (Chilcot, 2016b), .  What it does show is that a government facing little parliamentary 
opposition that is in control of the official machinery through which to shape and disseminate 
its narrative, is capable of delivering a campaign which is, at best partial and at worst deceptive 
(Herring & Robinson, 2014).  The impact of the 2002 dossier was profound, resulting in lasting 
damage to the reputation of Tony Blair and according to the Chilcot report, led to a “damaging 
legacy, including undermining trust and confidence in Government statements” which may, in 
future “make it more difficult to secure support for Government policy” (Executive Summary, 
Chilcot, 2016a, pp. 131, 116), see also (Seldon, 2005; Whiteley, et al., 2016).   
The year 1997 marked a crucial change in government approaches to the media. Labour came 
into power in May with a huge majority and transferred into government its strategic news 
management operation, determined to neutralise what had been the default right-wing bias of 
the national press during most of its 18 years in opposition (Curran & Seaton, 2010; Wilkes-
Hegg et al.,  2012).  The rules of engagement between government and the media were 
transformed through a process that has become identified with the idea of political spin but far 
from running its course, this process intensified beyond 2010, rising to the surface during the 
2016 European referendum campaign.  In 2017, the incoming Chair of the UK Statistics 
Authority, David Norgrove, a former Treasury economist, told MPs that the leave campaign’s 
repeated claim that EU membership cost £350m a week was “an ingregious use of statistics”.  
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Perhaps more seriously, he described the claim in a Treasury press release that “Britain will be 
worse off by £4,300 a year per household if Britain votes to leave the European Union” (HM 
Treasury, 2016) as “an overstatement” (PACAC, 24 January 2017).   
This paper draws on the findings of a larger qualitative study of change in the culture and 
practice of government media relations in the UK between 1997 and 2015, a period of rapid 
media proliferation when the narrative of political spin moved centre stagei (Garland, 2016).  It 
addresses the question of to what extent changes in news management during this period made 
it harder for government press officers to uphold their own propriety codes and norms.  Far 
from being empowered by a more proactive, creative and selective approach to news 
management, this article argues that government press officers were marginalised by the 
process and implicated by association.   A moren increasingly secretive,. pragmatic and 
instrumental approach to government media relations coincided with a steady decline in public 
trust in government, a factor that has come to preoccupy debate on both sides of the Atlantic 
with the notion of ‘post-truth’ politics. 
 
2. The ‘permanent campaign’ and the rise of political spin – are 
governments being ‘creative with the truth’? 
Much academic attention has focused on party political news m nagement while the larger and 
less visible civil service media operation remains relatively un-examined and under-theorised.  
This leaves a gap in knowledge and understanding, which the study on which this article is 
based set out to challenge (Garland, 2016).  The media relations role of special advisers (known 
as ‘SpAds’), the temporary civil servants who are appointed by and responsible to ministers and 
are exempt from impartiality is little known, although their wider role as political aides to 
ministers is attracting more academic attention (Faulkner & Everett, 2015; Gay, 2013; Yong & 
Hazell, 2014).  Many of their media relations activities are conducted ‘under the radar’, that is, 
informally and through off-the-record briefings, so their relationship with the official 
government news operation is not made transparent.  The special advisers’ code of conduct, for 
example, does not refer to their role as news providers, or as guardians of the Number 10 ‘news 
grid’ (Cabinet Office, 2016).   For a completeIn examinination ofg UK government 
communications therefore, we must consider three key actors involved in government media 
relations: impartial civil servants, SpAds, and ministers. , without whom no account of 
government communications can be complete.  This section will firstly examine the notion of 
truth in public communication and then consider the literature on the changing relations 
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between these actors over time.  Secondly, a novel conceptual framework is proposed, based on 
the idea of the ‘cross-field’: the interface where two or more distinct fields collide and interact to 
produce a unique set of patterns (Lingard et al., 2005; Rawolle, 2005).  Finally, the implications 
this has for the role of government press officers and the decline in public trust in government 
are considered. 
2.1 Creativity and truth in public communication 
“Your main task, day in, day out, is to defend the indefensible – cuts to policing, terrible 
immigration decisions – while simultaneously trying to avoid the ire of the ‘SpAds’, the special 
advisors (aka spin doctors) who run the show at big government departments”, Marianne Taylor, 
former government press officer (Taylor, 2017). 
 
The political strategists at the heart of New Labour argued that the form of “aggressive political 
PR” (Moloney, 2001) which came to be known as “spin”, was born of a fourth successive election 
defeat in 1992 that threatened the existence of Labour as an electoral force (Hyman, 2012; 
Mandelson, 2012). Philip Gould, one of the architects of New Labour, saw the task of 
overcoming the electoral weaknesses caused by a partisan right-wing press as a legitimate 
political battle fought using media management as a weapon (Lee, 1999).  Jonathan Powell, 
Tony Blair’s most senior adviser, argued that storytelling was important in government: “We 
provided the journalists with a new narrative after years of the same old stories about the Tories.  
The arts of spin worked” (Powell, 2010, p201).    In his diary entry for 26 September 2017 Blair’s 
spokesman, Alastair Campbell, justified the immediate radical shake-up then underway in the 
Government Information Service (GIS) by saying: “I was trying to modernise the GIS because it 
needed modernising, but I was also trying to make changes that would benefit us” (my 
emphasis) (Campbell & Hagerty, 2011), where ‘us’ is the Labour party-in-government.   During 
the first year of the Blair Government, 25 heads of information and their deputies were replaced 
– 50% of the total. By August 1999, all but two heads had been replaced (Oborne, 1999), and by 
2002, none was still in post (Franklin, 2004).   
From May 1997 onwards, observers, and especially journalists, noted an increasingly partisan, 
personalized and strategic approach to the use of government information (Demos, 2003; 
Jones, 1999; Rawnsley, 2000; Sixsmith, 2007). This made sense from a party political point of 
view, but risked contravening the GIS’s own 1997 propriety code that required government press 
officers to ensure that:   
While such information will acknowledge the part played by individual Ministers of the   
Government, personalization of issues or personal image making should be avoided.  Government 
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information or publicity activities should always be directed at informing the public (Government 
Information Service, 1997). 
So why did the system of government controls aimed at preventing such partisanship fail to 
regulate the initial threat to impartiality posed by the defenestration of the GIS leadership 
following the incoming Labour government of 1997? Part of the explanation may lie in the self-
regulating nature of the GIS, which was set up after WW2 as a separate hierarchy within the civil 
serviceii. Persuasion, and especially the use of creativity to encourage behaviour change, had 
been an inherent part of government communication since its origins in wartime (Grant, 1999; 
L'Etang, 2009).  Indeed, public relations theorists argue that the use of creativity is essential to 
the “added value” that is the raison d’être of the PR function.  For Green, creativity in PR is a 
form of flexible thinking and problem solving whereby recognition by others is achieved through 
the creation of “something new by bringing together two or more different elements in a new 
context” (Green, 2010, p. 8).  This is not novelty for its own sake but the application of creativity 
in order to uphold the client’s objectives and brand values.  For the government press officer, 
the ultimate client is the public, but the proximate one is the political leadership within the 
department, the ministerial team.   Faced by the challenge of the 1997 Labour government, the 
aAdherence to public values might have seemed obstructive and old-fashioned;, while being 
responsive to a more active management of the media on behalf of ministers was not only 
existentially necessary but consistent with the notion of innovative PR. . With their leadership 
decimated, their traditional practices under threat and the example of a successful news 
management model in front of them in the form of the incoming Labour SpAds, it was difficult, 
even impossible, to resist the new government’s more proactive approach to public 
communication.   
Cropley has argued that modern industrialised societies are so ‘enchanted’ with the idea of 
creativity, perhaps as a unique reflection of the individual spirit and personal fulfilment, that we 
frequently fail to consider its ‘dark side’ (Cropley, 2010).  He cites the promotional arts such as 
advertising, entertainment media and celebrity as being driven by the “application of creativity 
with the conscious and deliberate intention of doing harm to others” (p4).  He contrasts the 
‘divergent’ process of creativity with established rule-based systems that are intended to uphold 
values such as accuracy, fairness and transparency. Wisdom, he argues, is the accumulated 
experience of previous generations that aims to “maximise the common good, not just to seek 
his or her own advantage” (p10).  Here, in a nutshell, is the dilemma faced by the government 
communicator.  Within the maelstrom of a busy government press office, how realistic was it to 
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expect front line officers and their beleaguered leadership to place a distant public good over the 
immediate threats perceived by governing politicians?  
2.2 Media hypersensitivity in government  
Since the rise of 24/7 media in the late 1980s, the field of battle in politics has extended from 
parliament and the campaign trail into the governing executive, in the form of the ‘permanent 
campaign’ (Blumenthal, 1982; Norris, 2000).  As a matter of survival, governing politicians 
demand that all available tools in the media armoury are deployed in their interest, both 
politically and personally.  Studies from a number of countries have shown that politicians 
prioritise media attention, and believe that the mass media can determine their futures 
(Elmelund-Præstekær et al. 2011; Hennessy, 2014; Strömbäck, 2011; Van Aelst & Walgrave, 
2011).  Politicians have long been dominant suppliers of news (Barnett & Gaber, 2001; McNair, 
2007), and journalists have traditionally been the main gatekeepers to public attention (Davis, 
2007), with the result that media and political elites are thought to have become increasingly 
and “inextricably intertwined”, and distant from an alien and unknowable public (Blumler & 
Gurevitch, 1995, p. 26).   
British politicians’ hypersensitivity to the news media was revealed in their testimonies at the 
Leveson Inquiry into the press following the 2007-11 phone hacking scandal (Leveson, 2012).  
Senior politicians from all political parties criticised expressed concern at the power of the mass 
media, especially the national tabloids, to undermine governments and end political careers.  
Tony Blair described the behaviour of the media as "an abuse of power" and journalists as "these 
people" who are "all out against you"  and who will engage in "full on, full frontal, day in day 
out" attack that can "literally wash a government away" (Evidence session: 28/5/2012).  The 
then Prime Minister David Cameron explained why he employed a controversial former tabloid 
newspaper editor who was later jailed for his role in phone hacking as his Director of 
Communications. He needed "someone tough and robust" who could handle "the huge media 
pressure," where even the innocent are "thrown to the wolves" (Evidence session: 14/6/2012).  
The Leveson Inquiry concluded that politicians’ conduct in relation to the press: “contributed to 
a lessening of public confidence…by giving rise to legitimate …concerns that politicians and the 
press have traded power and influence in ways which are contrary to the public interest and out 
of public sight” (Leveson, 2012, III Press and Politicians, para 120).   
This article argues that this trading of information was conducted largely informally by special 
advisers, leading to  the marginalisation of government press officers.   This change is consistent 
with broader changes in public administration during the 1990s and beyond that tilted power 
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towards politicians while central public bureaucracies in many liberal democracies experienced 
a significant decline in autonomy and status along with the rise of New Public Management 
(Hustedt & Salomonsen, 2014; E. Page, 2007; J. Page, et al., 2012).  Peters claims that there has 
been an increase in “top down politicization” since the 1950s in many European countries, 
involving the exercise of greater power and control over the central bureaucracy by ruling 
politicians, and political parties (Peters & Pierre, 2004, p. 287).   Since control over the media 
relations function within central state bureaucracies is a major preoccupation of governing 
politicians, it is not surprising that much reform focused on government PR, “an area in which 
some of the more egregious failings on the part of political operatives…have been made 
manifest” (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2010, p. 205).   
 
2.3 Mediatization of government: the ‘cross-field’ as a site of struggle between 
different promotional operatives 
 
“Nothing, prepares you for working in Downing Street in intimate relationship with the Prime 
Minister…the pressure of events almost suffocates in its intensity…you are cut off from the 
outside world.  You function inside a combination of hothouse and bunker…you keep going on the 
adrenalin and the thrill of being at the summit of things”.  Christopher Meyer, former Chief Press 
Secretary to John Major (Meyer, 2006, p. 13). 
 
As we have seen,  the media relations function within government is handled by at least three 
key actors – government press officers, special advisers and politicians.  A fourth actor also 
plays a key role in crafting government narratives, the journalist.  In his empirical study into the 
relations between US government officials and beat reporters during the 1980s and 90s, Cook 
concluded that much of the negotiation about what becomes news takes place behind the scenes 
between political and government sources, and journalists (Cook, 1998).  As Meyer’s quote 
illustrates, the government news environment is political, adversarial, time-limited and even 
thrilling.  Reputations can be dashed, blame allocated, and news circulated around the globe 
within seconds (Lindquist & Rasmussen, 2012).  It is not enough, therefore, to consider the 
operation of government news management as either political communication or government 
public relations – it is a compelling and sometimes toxic combination of both. 
To conceptualise the relationship between governing politicians, special advisers, government 
press officers, and the media, this article adopts the ‘embedded’ mediatization approach...   This 
contrasts with Altheide and Snow’s original idea of media logic (Altheide, 2004), whereby the 
media production process intrudes “as an institutional rule into other fields where it now 
supplements (and in extreme cases replaces) existing rules for defining appropriate behaviour” 
(Esser, 2013, p. 160).  The embedded media tradition argues instead that the institutional and 
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cultural changes related to developments in media are so profound that they constitute a deep 
and long-term transformation in which more and more areas of human life are 
“communicatively constructed in a mediatized way” (Krotz, 2014, p. 139).   The empirical focus 
should beis on “the illumination of some of the shifting relations between and across multiple 
actors and the media” rather than on media institutions or actors (Hoskins & Loughlin, 2015, p. 
1325).  Mediatization works as  a ‘sensitizing concept’, guiding the exploration of changes in 
custom and practice over time across a range of domains and involving a range of meta-
processes (Lunt & Livingstone, 2016).    
This approach has taken mediatization scholars into a number of settings, including a handful 
conducted from within central governing bureaucracies.  In their analysis of the work of Swedish 
government communicators, Fredriksson et al. found that the formal autonomy of even arms-
length public bureaucracies was not enough to protect them from political interference.   In 
response to political demands, government press officers tried to increase the media profile of 
their organisation as a way of pleasing politicians, hoping thereby to resist further interference 
(Fredriksson, et al, 2015, p. 27).   Similarly, a Norwegian ethnographic study of communications 
specialists within an executive agency found a struggle between backstage and public facing 
officials to uphold “legitimate bureaucratic governance” against so-called “arbitrary rule”.  They 
argue that media pressure threatens to drive civil servants towards the latter, challenging their 
impartial ideals of equal treatment and the neutral bureaucracy (Thorbjornsrud, et al. 2014). 
Building on the work of Cook and others, the Australian scholars, Lingard and Rawolle, 
developed the idea of the ‘cross-field’ to explain the behaviour, culture and outputs of 
government actors negotiating with journalists to create and convey public policy messages 
(Lingard et al., 2005).  They define social fields as domains where particular forms of 
competition operate according to a distinctive logic of practice, and where individuals engaged 
in the competition are driven by a set of compelling but often unseen forces.   Although 
politicians and journalists operate in distinctive ways both culturally and institutionally, they 
drive and are driven by, the over-arching process of mediatization.  The ‘cross-field’, then, is a 
shared policy and representational space that exists metaphorically and institutionally at the 
intersection of politics, media and bureaucracy.  Here, problems and solutions are defined and 
sudden shifts in power, and struggles over meaning and interpretation take place.  The idea of 
the ‘cross-field’ can encapsulate the means by which governments attempt to re-frame public 
attitudes over the long term, both within specific policy areas, and in relation to persuasive 
campaigns such as that which arose from the British decision to support the US-led invasion of 
Iraq in 2003.   This conceptual framework provides some basis for understanding the powerful 
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forces that influenceunderlie the activities of government media actors, both press officers and 
special advisers, which appear compelling and irresistible in the short term but undermine long 
term credibility and ultimately public trust.  
 
3. Research design and methodology 
 
The study that forms the basis for this paper sought to provide a rare insight into the 
perceptions and experiences of UK government press officers between 1997 and 2015.   Such 
officials rarely or never comment in public while in post, or issue memoirs once departed, with 
the notable exception of Bernard Ingham, Mrs Thatcher’s press secretary, see (Ingham, 2003).  
In-depth semi-structured interviews were conducted with 16 former, largely middle-ranking, 
departmental government communicators, mainly press officers, who had served for an average 
of 15.2 years between 1961 and 2014. A further nine interviews with serving civil servants were 
conducted as part of another study (Garland et al, 20187).  The sampling method was purposive 
and used snowballing to ensure a spread of contacts over time and within a range of government 
departments.   
Most of the interview data related to the period from 1978 to 2015; 15 interviews covered the 
period between 1997 and 2010, and ten related to the period between 2010 and 2014.  To 
provide a range of perspectives, these accounts were augmented by additional interviews with 
two other types of media actor operating within the cross-field: six policy journalists and three 
special advisers who between them had held their positions for an average of 32 and five years 
respectivelyiii.  The response rates for the civil servants, journalists and special advisers were 
59%, 67% and 50%.  The topic guide was derived from a reading of academic and grey literature  
and anecdotal evidence from media interviews, political memoirs and biographies and was 
aimed at establishing what government press officers do, how they define their role and how 
they work with other civil servants, politicians and their advisers.  The conceptualisation was 
consistent with the theoretical framework that placed mediatization as the primary, overarching 
process within which other processes such as politicization take place.  CConcepts key to the 
conceptual framework, such as politicization, mediatizationmediatization, impartiality, 
personalisation and ‘spin’ were not referred to directly in the interview questioning. 
To provide an official context to the interviews, The interview data was augmented by a 
systematic analysis of four kinds of documentary evidence was conducted, bothin order to 
establish chronology during the period of study and provide an “additive function” to the 
interview data (Tansey, 2007, p.7)a context to the interview data.  A thorough trawl of official 
Formatted: Justified
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published documents relating directly and indirectly to government communications after 1997 
was conducted, consisting of all government and parliamentary reviews and reports that had a 
bearing on government media relations between 1997 and 2015, as well as any accessible 
internal GCS records such as departmental capability reviews, professional handbooks, 
government communications staffing lists, internal guidance and communications plans.  This 
corpus was augumented by two main tranches of material from the National Archives:  No.10 
papers concerned with the presentation of government policy between 1981 and 1983 (PREM 
19/720/721 and PREM 19/1775), and the available minutes of weekly central coordinating GIS 
meetings between 1980 and 1985 chaired by Bernard Ingham (MIO (E) 1080, and MIO 1980, 
1983 and 1985).  Finally all 1143 documents from the Ingham archive dated May 1979 to April 
1985iv were examined, comprising minutes, memos, letters, notes, briefings, and presentations 
relating to media matters.  :  
1.Archives  relating to the post-war organization of government publicity (CAB 78/37 and 
CAB 134/355); and the presentation of government policy from 1981-83 and 1983- 86 
(PREM 19/720/721 and PREM 19/1775).  
2.Documents from the Ingham archive dated May 1979 to April 1985, accessed through 
https://www.chu.cam.ac.uk/archives/collections/thatcher-papers/.  
3.Published government and parliamentary reviews and reports relating to government 
media relations between 1997 and 2016. 
4.Internal GCS records such as departmental capability reviews, professional handbooks, 
government communications staffing lists, internal guidance and communications plans. 
 
The interview transcripts and documentary material  wereas uploaded into Nvivo, the text-
processing software package, and all texts were analysed thematically using codes that arose 
from the text.  The approach to analysis was a hybrid one, combining deductive and inductive 
elements whereby “theory driven” codes were integrated with “data-driven codes” (Fereday & 
Muir-Cochrane, 2006, p.83).  Some top-level codes, such as ‘spin’, ‘journalism’, ‘civil service’ 
and ‘ministers’ were pre-assigned but most emerged as the texts were read through Nvivo. The 
form of analysis was cross sectional and categorical, seeking accounts of particular events and 
institutional changes across both interviews and documents. The coding frame eventually 
consisted of 76 separate codes, with a hierarchy of up to two or three levels, under 15 main 
headings.  The interview data was analysed first and used to establish a provisional coding 
scheme (Layder, 1998) which meant that a conceptual thread ran from the interview topic guide, 
Formatted: Bullets and Numbering
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itself derived from the literature review, to the documentary analysis, and back again.  The 
additional codes that arose from the documentary data were fed back as entries into the final 
coding frame, providing a ‘dialogue’ between the recollections of media and government actors, 
and the official documentary and archive record.  The approach to analysis was a hybrid one, 
combining deductive and inductive elements (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006). 
An innovation in this study was its historical approach: previous studies conducted from within 
public bureaucracies in Norway, Sweden and Australia focused on single snapshots in time.  
This study sought to fill this gap by making visible the everyday processes and mechanisms that 
take place over time, through the testimony of those most concerned with enacting them, and 
through contemporary documents.   Within the cross-field, facts are deployed strategically and 
selectively; even the translation from policy-speak to political speak, and then to media-speak, is 
a process of translation where choices of what to say and how to say it have to be made.   The 
study aimed to find out what influenced these choices over time, and how this influenced the 
possibility of democratic public communication.  In this article I draw on the interview and 
documentary evidence from the study that specifically relates to ideas of truth and selective or 
‘creative’ news management in order to dissect the working relationship between government 
press officers and media special advisers over time. 
 
4. Creative news management in government: an empirical analysis  
 
“Media advisors must always strive to be honest, basing their advice and briefings on what 
indisputable facts they can find (but) … the truth tends to be ambiguous. ..  Even facts are not always 
as solid as they seem and need checking and challenging vigorously, at times to the point of 
cussedness.  That was always my approach, but it failed the Iraq test” (John Williams: Statement for 
the Iraq Inquiry, 2010).   
 
In this statement, John Williams, former Director of Communications at the Foreign Office up 
to, during and after the 2003 Iraq War, expresses’ regret that his normally rigorous approach to 
the facts, gleaned over long experience as a journalist, failed to prevent a disastrous misuse of 
intelligence information.  Despite his seniority, he had neither the institutional nor cultural 
capital within government to influence decisions about the distribution of information.   An 
interviewee for this study, also a former journalist who worked as a strategic communications 
adviser between 2008 and 2010, described working in government as exciting but demanding 
and stressful beyond anything she had experienced in her 20s years as a journalist.   As a 
journalist she had only seen “a tiny bit” of what happens in government; it was a major task of 
translation and simplification to make complex policy information palatable to journalists: 
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When you’re in the department you see it all … at a very senior level so it’s a very kind of 
privileged position and you begin to understand policy development and implementation, in all 
its forms in just a totally different way, so your knowledge expands enormously (C1). 
 
In his 1983 BBC Reith Lectures the former joint Head of the Civil Service, Douglas Wass (1981-
3), anticipated the rise of political spin when he identified a perennial tension between 
governments and the media that he believed increased the risk of  three modes of behaviour that 
undermined public trust:  the misleading use of information, the irresponsible use of 
unauthorised information, and the “deliberate and covert briefing of select elements” (Wass, 
1984).  He warned that, since there was no provision within the UK government for externally 
auditing the process, ministers would continue to be “judges in their own court”.  They could 
suppress information likely to cause political embarrassment or selectively brief certain findings 
that supported their policies.  Ultimately, he said, such manipulation will breed “disgust, 
cynicism and eventually contempt”.   In this section we examine what form such manipulation of 
privileged information took and consider the role of the government press officer in facilitating 
or resisting the normalization of a more creative approach to news management after 1997.   
 
4.1 ‘Being creative’: the misleading use of government information 
 
The Chilcot and Butler inquiries criticised the government for presenting the intelligence on 
Iraq’s WMDs without sufficient caveats as to the uncertainty of the data.   Concerns arose in 
particular with regard to Tony Blair’s foreword to the dossier, where he stated that Saddam’s 
“military planning allows for some of the WMDs to be ready within 45 minutes of an order to 
use them” (HM Government, 2002).  The source was later discredited but not before blanket 
headlines such as “Brits 45 minutes from doom” (The Sun, 25 September 2002) had amplified a 
message that powerfully supported the Blair narrative.  The philosopher, Neil Manson, 
considered the ethics of such practices, which he refers to as ‘truthful spin’; the intentional 
placing of a selective fact in the public domain that will almost certainly be misinterpreted 
(wilfully or not), to serve the advantage of the client.  He concluded that this was not only 
damaging to public trust, but was unethical and deceitful (Manson, 2010).  In many sectors, the 
use of facts in order to create a self-advantaging impression would fit within Green’s definition 
of strategic creativity in PR as discussed in section 2.1 (Green, 2010), but in government, it 
becomes problematic, and hence subject to voluntary codes on propriety.   
The first Permanent Secretary for Government Communications, Howell James (C2), noted the 
practice of incomplete truth telling that could mislead, when he told MPs that post 1997 
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governments had “a tendency to rebut too vigorously and too quickly without recourse to the full 
facts” leading to “an inflation of language around policies” (Public Administration Select 
Committee, 2006).  The House of Lords Communications Committee was similarly critical of 
the misuse of government statistics by deploying them “as a political weapon” that could 
“reinforce a political point” (House of Lords, 2009).   
In his interview, Sir Robin (now Lord) Butler, Cabinet Secretary between 1988 and 1998, 
noticed a change in the approach to government information in 1997 which caused him concern 
and led him to commission his deputy, Robin Mountfield, to conduct a review into ministers’ 
dissatisfaction with the operation of the GIS (Mountfield, 1997). He argued that government had 
become “more political”. 
The political battle is conducted through the media on a 24/7 basis (so) ministers and politicians 
obviously give more attention to that battle and they put pressure on civil servants to support 
them in that (C3). 
The growing tendency for ministers to sanction individual news briefings by special advisers led 
to a focus on personalised storytelling that ‘coloured’ what would otherwise be ‘dry’ policy 
announcements:  
It was quite well known for a political correspondent to say to a special adviser ‘I hear your 
minister got the worst of it in cabinet this morning’ and for the special adviser to say ‘oh no, no, 
no, old Bloggs got the worst of it’, so that you build up a story by playing off special advisers.  
The corollary to the selective release of facts that support the government narrative is the 
suppression of facts that don’t.  This press officer (1999-2004) explained how: 
Researchers might have been commissioned to go away and review a policy…something that the 
minister really likes, and actually the policy is found to be ineffective or not very effective or it’s 
not as effective as they thought and of course ministers didn’t necessarily want the information 
out there (C4).   
Another respondent remembered a decision taken during the Blair years not to publish the 
findings of a report commissioned into public attitudes towards immigration because it was seen 
as a “time bomb”: 
The research showed that virtually everybody in the country whether they were ABC1C2DE or 
they were Guardian readers, Mail or Express, had concerns about the level of immigration, 
whether they were immigrants themselves – that’s long standing immigrants – all had concerns 
about it.  Now the government had a policy, which was pro-immigration and they had lots of 
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reasons why they felt it was a benefit…that research was put under lock and key.  It was never 
used (C5). 
This decision was unprecedented in this interviewee’s experience since convention held that 
publicly funded information should always be made available in some form.  In her view, it also 
led to policy failures because, without acknowledging that a significant majority of the 
population had concerns about immigration, it was harder to address or challenge them.   News 
stories have occasionally surfaced about similar omissions, for example in 1994, when it was 
claimed that eight Home Office research projects were “being systematically shelved by 
ministers” because their findings contradicted the Home Secretary Michael Howard’s policy 
agenda (Travis, 1994).  In 2014, two stories accused Downing Street of suppressing a report that 
fewer jobs were taken by immigrants than had been claimed by the then Home Secretary, 
Theresa May (C. Cook, 2014).  The campaigning charity, Sense about Science, uncovered 
evidence of delays in the publication of government-funded research into food banks and the 
impact of immigration on the labour market, and called on the government to comply with its 
own protocols on publishing research. The report concluded that without a comprehensive 
register of such research delays or even suppression would continue (Sedley, 2016).   
 
4.2 ‘Being creative’: the use of unauthorised information 
 
Government convention, as iterated in propriety guidance and codes of conduct, prohibits the 
use of taxpayer-funded resources to conduct party electioneering, to overtly criticise the 
opposition or previous governments, boost the personal profile of individual ministers, conduct 
media briefing against colleagues, or deliberately mislead the public.   Yet according to 
respondents all of these practices take place, some routinely.  
Nadine Smith, who performed a number of senior roles in departments and at the Cabinet Office 
(1998-2009), recalled in her interview how:  
When I worked with Alan Milburn, his press special adviser was very much focused on winning 
the next election and that was tricky at times because there was quite a lot they were doing that 
was more about electioneering than it was about focusing on the government policy of the day 
(C6). 
A departmental press officer (2010-2014) remembers being instructed by ministers to release 
information to “friendly” media outlets, which while not untrue, was selective, and deliberately 
aimed at challenging the austerity claims of other public sector bodies by criticizing their 
management.   As he explained, the aim was “to limit the damage from the (austerity) narrative 
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and at the same time promote your own”.  He was expected to prioritise the Daily Telegraph 
because it was read by potential Conservative voters, while avoiding the left-of-centre Guardian 
(C7). This contravenes the GCS code, which states, “to work effectively, media officers must 
establish their impartiality and neutrality with the news media, and ensure that they deal with 
all news media even-handedly” (Government Communications Service, 2015)(my emphasis).   
Propriety codes state that attacks on political opponents cannot be issued as official government 
texts and should be conducted from the party press office, not by ministers or civil servants 
(Government Communications Service, 2014).  This is reiterated in the special adviser code of 
conduct, which states “briefing on purely party political matters must be handled by the party 
machine” (Cabinet Office, 2016, p. 4).  Yet the same respondent described such attacks on the 
opposition as being so routine as to be normalised: 
Any direct criticism of current Labour party policy was always done via the special advisers and it 
wouldn’t normally be emailed out to them…the special adviser would take the lead on this and say 
‘because we want to do a political attack as part of the response, we’ll deal with that’. 
Jonathan Haslam, former press secretary to John Major who left government in 1998, felt that 
the de facto role of the special adviser was to promote their minister personally, whatever the 
guidance said:  
That’s what they are there for.  If they didn’t do it, it’s rather a career limiting opportunity because 
they are a personal appointment.  Who’s their chief, their star, their leader?  It’s the guy who 
appointed them.   
By talking up the individual achievements, the battles that are won behind the scenes, the 
insights, the relationship that the minister has with the Prime Minister, any one of a dozen 
mechanisms or a continual drip feed of activities to make sure that their person is seen in the best 
possible light.  And why wouldn’t you if you were in that position?” (C8). 
 
Such informal, unrecorded and off the record briefings, either by phone or in person, were 
flexible enough to be open to interpretation, so if controversy erupted they could be denied.  One 
long-serving broadsheet journalist went off the record to say that “there were one or two who I 
knew for a fact would lie to me, so I would stop talking to them.  It’s pointless if they are going to 
lie to you”, and yet, he added, “I’ve never had a press officer lie to me.  And it’s kind of crucial.  
Because what do you believe?” (J1). 
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4.3 ‘Being creative’: the covert briefing of selective elements 
The biggest single change observed consistently throughout this study was the change in the 
rules of engagement in relation to government news management after 1997.  Nadine Smith 
became aware of an alternative channel of communication involving special advisers that she 
felt it was safer to ignore: 
There were a lot of phone calls made that I didn’t know about.  I don’t think I wanted to know 
about every phone call …because if something went wrong in the press I’d almost rather not know 
that they’d started the fire (C6). 
During the Coalition period, this departmental press officer (2010-14) took direction from the 
minister’s media special adviser 
…on what interviews to accept or try and line-up, which journalists should be briefed, for which 
stories, so in terms of how we divided work, I think especially, the comms department did all the 
legwork and the grunt work, and the special advisers were there to help advise on what direction 
they wanted it to take.  We were aware that they were having discussions with favoured 
journalists (C7). 
For Bernard Ingham, operating a generation earlier, this was anathema.  The public duty of the 
government communicator required that, among journalists, “you don’t have favourites; you are 
there to serve all equally” (C9).  Jonathan Haslam agreed that “all the media ought to be treated 
equally.”   Yet the veteran science journalist, Nigel Hawkes, was able to tell MPs in 2009 that 
“you would not these days ring departmental press officers to find out what is going on” (House 
of Lords, 2009).    
The change in government news management practices was most clearly articulated by the 
journalists interviewed for this study, who experienced the insertion of special advisers into the 
news management structure of government after 1997 as immediate and dramatic.   The BBC’s 
home affairs correspondent (1989-2002) Jon Silverman found that the insider briefings from 
the SpAds were essential in helping him to deliver exclusives across a range of platforms.  He 
would ring the Home Office SpAd as late as midnight to pick up a story for the next day’s radio 
news bulletin:  
I could get 90% of what I wanted out of (him)…rather than the press office.  The press office was 
useful for the mechanics of how a story was going to be issued…but if you really wanted the sort of 
thrust of it, especially to get it the day before so you could put it out in the morning and help set 
the agenda, the special adviser became the main conduit (J2). 
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With this came discrimination between favoured and unfavoured journalists.  David Brindle of 
The Guardian was no longer favoured because, as a specialist, he was not part of the political 
lobby:  
They have their pecking order in terms of who they’d really want to take a call from and get on to 
… in some cases working with the civil service press people, but typically around them, over them, 
dealing with handpicked journalists who were being fed the story and the rest of us on the press 
side, the journalists who were not favoured, and on the Whitehall side, the press officers who 
were left out of the loop, would be trailing in the wake of this (J4). 
Nicholas Jones, who worked for BBC news until 2002, also noticed that “the special advisers 
were calling the shots increasingly” (J3).   This was epitomised by the centrally-coordinated 
news diary (known as ‘the grid’) that was introduced after 1997.   This was, he said, a ”political 
tool” that was run, not by civil servants, as was commonly believed, but by SpAds: it had “the 
civil service stamp” and was “accommodated within the civil service structure”, but was driven 
by a political agenda.  Similar findings were observed in an interview study in Northern Ireland, 
which concluded that press officers were marginalised as news providers by special advisers who 
conducted exclusive, off the record briefings to selected journalists (Rice, Somerville, & Wilson, 
2015).  Jonathan Haslam sees this as a major shift “from special advisers talking up their 
ministers…to having a much greater say in every sense of the word over what the department 
would be saying to the media”.    All three elements related to creative news management – 
covert individual briefing, the mis-use of unauthorised information and the misleading use of 
privileged government information – were conducted in spite of government press officers, and 
contributed to their increasing marginalisation. 
 
 
5. Conclusion  
The former head of the civil service Robert Armstrong (1979-87), described the “professional 
civil service communicator” as “one of the bulwarks against a blurring of the distinction between 
party political and government communications” (House of Lords, 2008), and indeed, propriety 
guidance places the responsibility on them to uphold the distinction between impartial and 
party political communication.  On the evidence presented here, given the competitive pressures 
operating within the ‘cross-field’, it is unrealistic to expect front line government press officers 
and their beleaguered leadership in government communications to place a distant public good 
over the immediate and existential threats perceived by their proximate clients, the governing 
politicians.   The deployment of professional creativity needed to ensure impactful 
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communication with the public through the media, and loyalty to the immediate client, the 
government of the day, take precedence over the wisdom of serving an abstract public good.  
Institutionally, the defenestration of the service after 1997, the drive to provide story-rich 
political narratives for the national media, and the deployment of special advisers in media 
management roles, has steadily intensified, making it harder for government press officers to 
uphold their own propriety codes.    
This study has reported on practices that contravene the codes, such as selective briefing, 
unclear source attribution, the suppression of uncomfortable information, tactical instruction of 
civil servants by political appointees, and attempts to seek electoral advantage within 
government through taxpayer funded resources.  Public relations requires a form of strategic 
communication that benefits the client but in government, custom, practice and codified rules 
are there to ensure that the whole public, including the majority that did not vote for the ruling 
party, are collectively represented within the corridors of power.   Far from being empowered by 
a more proactive and creative approach to news management, government press officers have 
been marginalised by the unseen power of media special advisers working directly for ministers, 
and largely under the radar.  To build and maintain public trust, the task of upholding ethical 
public communication cannot be left to government press officers alone.  The civil service as a 
whole must uphold a long-term and publicly shared vision of what government communications 
should be which goes beyond the narratives presented by the government of the day.  Yet this is 
not just the task of public servants.  Parliament must be given the power to hold governments to 
account for their custodianship of the public communications function, this most politically 
sensitive of public goods. 
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